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ABSTRACT
This paper shows that the international harmonization of commercial legal rules and
commercial legal standards in Latin America have been the result of very specific legal and
economic country-specific factors.  The paper proposes that international legal
harmonization within a regional bloc of countries is a function of the convergence of three
broad conditions: (1) first, the a priori international country-to-country compatibility in the
form and scope of their legal rules applied to domestic commercial transactions; (2) second,
the emergence and growth of intra sectoral international markets supported by foreign direct
investment; and (3) third, the emergence and growth of domestic trade-related industries
seeking compatible legal rules in their exporting markets abroad.  A jurimetric model is
introduced in Part III showing that the drive to seek international legal harmonization has
been explained by these specific economic and legal domestic factors.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Recent literature on legal and economic regional integration has stressed the key role
of emerging trading blocs in shaping the world economy of the 20th-century.1  Economic
trends -- such as rapid changes in applied research, technology, capital flows, and trade
patterns -- have all assumed an enhanced importance in fostering economic growth.
According to Abramowitz (1989), the extent to which a country that is technologically
behind a leader is able to catch up will depend in part on its social capability to absorb
advanced technologies.2  Nelson and Wright (1992) and Porter (1985) state that the main
factors fostering the social capability for technological improvement include a strong
research and development ("R&D") sector, higher educational institutions satisfying the
demand for scientists and engineers emanating from emerging markets, and competitive
environments acting as disciplinary factors for firms.3  None of these publications, however,
discuss in depth the required legal changes needed to foster competitive environments and
enhance the capabilities to absorb technologies.
Developing nations are currently facing a unique opportunity created by global free
trade, the continuous decline in transportation and communication costs coupled with the
unprecedented availability of generic applied knowledge, and the expanding flows of
international financial investments.  However, throughout their history, many of these
countries have lacked the institutional capability to create or absorb the applied knowledge
aforementioned.4
The main purpose of the analysis advanced in this paper is to explain how the limited
international harmonization of commercial legal rules and commercial legal standards in Latin
America has been the result of specific domestic legal and economic factors.  This paper
                                                
1See Davey, William, J. Jackson, and Alan Sykes (1995), Legal Problems of International
Economic Relations (1995), Boston:  Harvard University Press, pp. 23-121.
2Abramovitz, Moses (1989), Thinking About Growth. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
3See Porter, Michael (1985), Competitive Advantage, New York, The Free Press;  Nelson,
Richard and Gavin Wright (1992), "The Rise and Fall of American Technological Leadership:
The Postwar Era in Historical Perspective," The Journal of Economic Literature;
Rosenberg, Nathan (1985), "The Commercial Exploitation of Science by American Industry,"
in Clark, K., R. Hayes, and C. Lorenz, The Uneasy Alliance: Managing the Productivity
Technology Dilemma. Boston: Harvard Business School Press; and Schumpeter, J.A. (1950),
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper.
4Buscaglia, Edgardo, 1993. "Law, Technological Progress, and Economic Development."
Working Paper.# 391, Palo Alto, Calif.: Hoover Institution, International Studies Program.
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shows that the international legal harmonization is a function of the convergence of three
broad conditions: (1) first, the a priori international country-to-country compatibility in the
form and scope of their legal rules applied to domestic commercial transactions; (2) second,
the emergence and growth of intra sectoral international markets supported by foreign direct
investment; and (3) third, the emergence and growth of domestic trade-related industries
seeking compatible legal rules in their exporting markets abroad.  Specifically, the
compatibility in the evolutionary natures of two or more economic and legal systems will be
introduced as a factor that will affect the desirability and feasibility of international legal
integrations.  Moreover, a jurimetric model is introduced in Part III proving that the drive to
seek international legal harmonization in Latin America is explained by well-specified
economic and legal factors
In the next section, this paper will describe the main drives toward legal integration
within South America during the 19th and 20th centuries.  A jurimetric analysis follows in
Part III revealing the connections between legal integration and economic structures.  Part
IV offers a conclusion of our analysis.
II. DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT OF THE LEGAL INTEGRATION
EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA
Most of the civil law countries in Latin America achieved their independence in the
nineteenth century and, one after the other, adopted codified law within the Roman and
Germanic tradition.  Much of the codification observed in Latin American legal history until
the early 20th century was the product of transplanting civil, commercial, and penal codes
from Europe to the different countries in the region.5  During the period from 1825 to 1890,
substantive and procedural civil, commercial, and criminal codes were all transplanted from
the French Codification, with few adaptations, to the South American scene.6  For example,
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela adopted the
Napoleonic Code even though they had never been under French territorial control.  The
impact of the American Constitution on Latin American public law is another example of a
transplant.7  As a result, most Latin American legal systems started from the same
evolutionary base.8
The complexity of a legal system is the product of its evolution.  This complexity is
defined in terms of the breadth of socio-economic interactions that a legal system is capable
of addressing.  As an economic structure evolves from its agrarian origin to a more
                                                
5See Alan Watson (1983), The Civil Law,  Cambridge University Press, pp. 24-78.
6See John Henry Merryman (1985), The Civil Law Tradition, 2nd Edition, Stanford
University Press, pp. 26-89.
7Id. at 39.
8Specifically, the compatibility in the evolutionary natures of two or more legal systems will be
introduced as a  factor that will affect the need and feasibility of legal integrations.
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diversified economic structure, the legal system would tend to branch out from its
evolutionary base in order to address the higher diversity of economic interactions.  In this
respect, if a legal system were not subject to substantive changes in its private law, a
possible explanation is that its economic structure may not have experienced much change
compared to its agrarian beginnings (i.e., new economic sectors or changes in the relative
importance of these sectors).9  In fact, this economic evolution provides an explanation of
why those legal systems in which only mild changes in the sectoral structure of their GDP
have occurred and where the agricultural sector still prevails (such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Peru) address substantive and procedural problems of commercial law in strikingly similar
ways and without showing much evolution relative to their initial legal structures.10  In fact,
within countries such as Bolivia and Paraguay one can observe that present economic
structures are not too different from the ones observed at the time when the early 19th
century transplants occurred.  In short, the complexity in the evolution of private law is also
explained by the complexity in the development of its economic structure.  In this context,
one can claim that the economic structures (i.e., composition and relative importance of
productive sectors) provide the direction followed by the legal evolution in domestic
commercial rules (i.e. amendments to the commercial code addressing new specific
commands regulating economics interactions) and also provide the direction followed by the
legal evolution in domestic commercial  standards (i.e. amendments to the commercial code
addressing new general norms pertaining to economic interactions).11
                                                
9One can observe that, within the volatile political history of the region, agrarian economies'
public laws (e.g., constitutional or labor law frameworks) were subject to drastic changes
regardless of the stage of development.  One can also observe that private law, however, in
the form of civil and commercial codes, have experienced only minor changes since their
inception.  See Clagett, H. (1952), La Administracion de Justicia en Latinoamerica, NY:
Oceana Publications.
10Karst points at these similarities found among the legal systems of Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Peru without addressing its possible causes. Karst, Kenneth (1966), Latin American Legal
Institutions:  Problems for Comparative Study, Los Angeles: Latin American Ceneter; and
de Robertis, Manuel (1988), "Un Analisis Legal Comparado de los Sistemas
Latinoamericanos," Unpublished Manuscript, Conferencia de Analisis Juridico Hemisferico:
Universidad Nacional de Busnos Aires.
11 Forces related to the determination of comparative advantages in production  and that the
composition of a country's trade reflects the relative abundance of factors in that country's
endowment, also determine the composition and relative strength of productive sectors.  These
economic forces, however, are always enhanced or hampered by the political weight of
organized constituencies.  For an understanding of the economic factors' impact on the
determination of the productive structure, see Wright, Gavin (1990), "The Origins of American
Industrial Success," American Economic Review, 107, pp. 651-668; Olson, Mancur (1984)
The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Groweth. Inflation, and Social Rigidities;
and North, Douglass (1982)  Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic
Performance, Cambridge University Press.
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Testing this general theory within the Latin American historical context, one can find
out that a bottom-up approach to law-making in the commercial area provided the
framework for international legal and economic convergence during the period within which
the Gold Standard ruled international trade.12  This period was characterized by the
emergence of manufacturing capital-intensive industries in Latin America that were aiming at
reaching economies of scale by expanding sales to foreign markets.13  In this context, Latin
American new industries attempted to sponsor international economic integration schemes
since the early stages of their history.  As a result, governments reacted before these
powerful industrial groups by seeking international legal and economic regional agreements.
There is a rich historical background addressing legal interrelations within the region.
Starting with the Congress of Panama in 1826 and the Congress of Lima in 1864-65 where
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru took the first steps toward greater legal harmony by
adopting a postal treaty and a trade and navigation treaty.14  In these treaties, all the
contracting parties expressed their resolve to provide their reciprocal trade with all possible
facilities and protection, "as one of the most effective means of promoting the development
and growth of their industry and wealth and making a future Confederation of states more
secure and prosperous."15   Both in the Trade and Navigation 1864 Treaties, there is an
express provision for natives or nationals of all contracting Latin American states to be
considered as equals with regard to a wide range of objectives and areas.  This principle
went on to become the direct legal foundation of what would later be known as the Latin
American principle of equality of nationals and foreigners regarding the international liability
of states when foreign nationals are subject to torts and/or property damage.  Moreover, the
First Treaty of Lima signed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru in 1848
contains a rule whereby the contracts signed and documents executed in one of the signatory
republics would have the same force and validity in the others, and the authorities, judges,
and courts would be required to enforce them.16  New initiatives presented by the
governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile led to the Congress of Jurists held in Lima
between 1877 and 1880 establishing uniform rules in the design of private international
law.17
                                                
12  A partial account of international legal treaties during the 19th century is taken  from Velez
Muniz (1951), El Acercamiento de los Sistemas Legales en Latinoamerica, Buenos Aires:
Editorial UBA, pp. 123-256.
13  Id. at 23-34
14 Id.
15Segundo Congreso de Lima, Articles 23.  In Acevedo, Carlos (1987), La Historia de la
Integracion.  Editorial El Planeta, Buenos Aires.
16Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (Argentina), "Documento de Negociacion No
1214/A" Biblioteca Historica de Relaciones Exteriores, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
17Id.
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Subsequently, during the Second Congress of Jurists, held in Montevideo in 1888-
89, eight treaties and an additional protocol were adopted.  These treaties were sponsored
and drafted by Argentine, Brazilian, and Chilean jurists.  The treaties covered procedural
law, literary and artistic property, patents for inventions, trademarks and brand names,
international criminal law, and international civil law.18  The protocol contained general rules
for applying the laws of any of the contracting states in the territories of the others.  Later,
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru proposed a major step in legal integration when their
intention in codifying international law was recognized in the Convention for the Drafting of
Codes on Public and Private International Law, signed in 1902, and during the International
Law Convention, signed at the Inter American Conference of Rio de Janeiro in 1906.19
Both treaties established methods and procedures to further the process of legal codification
and cooperation at the Inter-American level.  In all these cases, the countries pushing for
international legal integration were at the same time experiencing changes in their trade-
related economic structures that were addressed through amendments to their domestic
commercial and/or civil codes.  In other words, one can conclude that during the 19
th
century and early 20
th century we can already observe a pattern of legal harmonization
driven by international trade and economic change.
The process of codification of private international law in the Inter-American context
has clearly been one of the ongoing legal activities of the American states since the closing
decades of the last century.  This work has taken on different institutional forms and is
currently being carried out as a legal process through the Specialized Conferences on
Private International Law (CIDIP) under the auspices of the United Nations.  Since the start
of the codification of private international law, two different approaches have been taken:
one involved a global approach that envisaged a single body of rules covering all aspects of
private law; the other approach envisaged a process that was more gradual and progressive,
involving the drafting of specific international instruments.  The approach of drafting a single
code was the prevailing one during the aforementioned 1877 Congress of Lima and
culminated in the adoption of a single code of international law, the Bustamante Code, at the
Sixth International Conference of American States in Havana in 1928.20
Beginning in the 1960's and as part of the Organization of American States (OAS)
framework, the Inter American Juridical Committee made efforts to codify all the different
areas of private international law.  To that end and in light of the U.S. Restatement of the
Law of the Conflicts of Laws for private international law, the Committee proposed to
review the Bustamante Code to determine whether it was possible to merge its provisions
with those of the Montevideo Treaties of 1889 and 1939-40.  The First Specialized
Conference in Private Law adopted conventions covering international trade and procedural
                                                
18This constitutes the Latin American legal response to the Paris and Berne Conventions in
Europe.  Latin American and other international historians have not paid due attention to this
first step in the process of legal convergence within the intellectual property area.  Id.
19Id.
20Id.
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law in 1975.  These are the Inter American conventions on conflict of laws concerning bills
of exchange, promissory notes, and invoices; on conflict of laws concerning checks; on
international commercial arbitration; on letters; on the taking of evidence abroad; and on the
legal regime of powers of attorney to be used abroad.  The 1979 Second Specialized Inter-
American Conference also approved conventions on international trade law and international
procedural law focusing on rules concerning checks and conflicts of laws involving
commercial companies.  With respect to international procedural law, these Inter-American
conventions covered standards of proof and discovery material, enforcement of injunctions,
and extraterritorial validity of foreign rulings and arbitral awards.  Lastly, the Third, Fourth,
and Fifth Specialized Conference approved the Inter American Convention on Law to be
applied to international contracts where the first common ground for a hemispheric
commercial code was established.   As a result of this effort, the Inter American Juridical
Committee prepared a draft code, but it was not supported by the member states of the
OAS.21  This situation led to the abandonment of the global approach of codification of
Inter-American codification, and the beginning of a second stage in which sectoral
codification prevailed.22
In fact, during the mid 20
th century one can already observe that, under the OAS
umbrella, those countries that were not undergoing profound economic changes in their
private sector structure did not show and, in fact, did not support a legal integration
sponsored by the relatively more complex legal and economic national systems of the region.
Moreover, the countries supporting legal integration were in all cases the ones subject to
more dynamic economic changes (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile), while reservations and
opposition emerged from the mostly traditional-agrarian economies (i.e., Bolivia, Paraguay,
Peru, and Uruguay).23  In this context and within the OAS framework, intergovernmental
meetings were scheduled to deal with special technical and limited matters or to develop
special aspects of  inter-American cooperation.24
As result of all of the above agreements, the legal systems in countries such as
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile started to address new types of economic interactions reflecting
higher levels of specialization and division of labor within their domestic markets.  As the
relative growth of their agricultural sectors diminished and information intensive sectors of
the economy grew, commercial codes became subject to major re-drafting.  Table 1 below
covers the period 1890-1980 and shows the number of amendments introduced to the
commercial codes in each country.  The amendments included in this table were all aimed at
addressing new types of economic interactions as the direct result of the growth of the non-
agricultural manufacturing and service sectors.  These non-agricultural manufacturing and
                                                
21 refer to Muniz supra note 12 at pp. 116
22 refer to Muniz supra note 12 at pp. 121-139.
23Refer to OAS/Doc. 1356-WP at Joint IMF-Bank Staff Library, Washington, D.C.
24Garcia-Lopez, Jorge (1973), Las Leyes y las Instituciones Internacionales, Editorial
ADEBA, pp. 13-56.
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service sectors were composed of firms producing agro-manufacturing, chemicals,
pharmaceuticals, steel, financial services, transportation, communications, and energy.25
Finally, we also measure the number of international legal agreements addressing
harmonization of commercial laws.  Table 1 compares the dynamic economies of Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile (where the average real annual growth in sales of the non-agricultural
manufacturing and service industries during the period 1890-1980 exceeded 2 percent
annually) to countries that experienced no significant changes in the number and relative
strength of their non-agricultural manufacturing and service sectors such as Bolivia, Ecuador,
Uruguay, and Venezuela.
                                                
25Vazquez Presedo, Vicente (1981), Historia Economica del Cono Sur, Editorial EUDEBA,
pp. 12-45.
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TABLE 126
Legal Changes vs. Economic Structure During 1890-1980
Country # of High-GrowthTrade Related  # of Amendments # of  Internat.
Non-Agricultural Industries In Commercial Codes
Commercial
Agreements
Argentina 11 353 20
Bolivia 1 9 2
Brazil 12 402 24
Chile 6 278 15
Colombia 0 5 6
Ecuador 1 7 6
Peru 0 20 7
Uruguay 0 7 5
Venezuela 1 12 3
As shown in Table 1, there is a strong association among the three legal and
economic variables.  That is, the number of non-agricultural industries experiencing an
average of more than 2 percent of real growth in their compounded annual sales (i.e.
capturing the speed of economic changes in their national economic structure) is associated
with a higher number of legal amendments to the commercial/civil codes addressing the new
type of economic interactions taking place within the new industries.  Moreover, these two
patterns are also associated with  a strong drive of a country to harmonize its commercial
legal framework through international trade-related agreements.   For example, we observe
that Brazil and Argentina who possess the most dynamic economies during the period 1890-
1980 (with 12 and 11 new non-agricultural trade-related industries respectively) are also the
countries with the largest number of amendments to their commercial/civil codes (402 and
                                                
26The information related to amendments is provided by Aragon, Ramiro (1978),
Codificacion Civil en Latinoamerica, Buenos Aires:  Editorial EUDEBA; the quantitative
data related to the growth in sales in the non-agricultural manufacturing and service industries
is taken from Vazquez, Julio (1991), La Historia Economica de America del Sur, Rosario,
Argentina: Editorial Atlantida, pp. 12-15;  the number of international legal agreements per
country is included in Carcano, Miguel Angel (1941), Historia de la Diplomatica Argentina,
Buenos Aires: Ed. Perfil, pp. 56-62; and Urrutia, Juan Jose (1992) Los Acuerdos
Comerciales Internacionales en el Continente Americano: Precedentes para la Region.
FCE Editorial: Mexico.
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353 respectively) and with the largest number of trade-related legal treaties signed (i.e. 20
for Argentina and 24 for Brazil).  As was claimed above, more complex economic systems
(i.e. a larger number of high growth trade-related non-agricultural industries) reflect a higher
complexity in their domestic legal systems measured through the introduction of amendments
in their civil/commercial codes.  At the same time, Table 1 also shows that the more dynamic
economies are also more likely to harmonize their legal systems through international legal
agreements.  The international legal agreements measured here cover the harmonization of
legal standards (e.g. health standards applied to merchandise crossing international borders),
the harmonization of legal standards applied to commerce in general (e.g. codifying the
principles of territoriality and independence), the harmonization of rules (e.g. duration and
scope of patents), and the harmonization of legal doctrines (e.g. the doctrine of equivalence
in the treatment of real property or the fair use doctrine in the use of copyrights).27  For
example, one can observe that starting in the mid 19
th century, Latin American countries
started to adhere to two fundamental legal standards addressing the enforcement of laws:
first, the principle of territoriality, based on the premise that rights and obligations need to
be honored according to each state’s domestic rules.  This principle is also known as the
Calvo Doctrine.   This doctrine maintains that "aliens are only entitled to those legal rights
and privileges enjoyed by nationals, and hence may seek redress for grievances only before
local authorities and to the extent permitted by local law."28  The second principle of
independence indicated that the definition of rights within one state does not force other
states to grant the same rights.  Clearly, these two principles are examples of international
harmonization of laws.
                                                
27  All of these international agreements deal with measures related to strengthening foreign
investment protection, simplifying technical standards, regulating professional services,
standards to be applied to the intepretation of territoriality and independence, and the
harmonization in the enforcement of tangible and intangible property rights (e.g. introducing the
doctrine of equivalence, the doctrine of fair use in copyrights, rules dealing with duration and
scope of patents, and standards to be applied to the intepretation of pipeline protection.)
28The Calvo Doctrine, named after Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo (1824-1906) was adopted by
most Latin American states in the 19th century.  For an analysis of this doctrine, see Alden F.
Abbott (1976), "Latin America and International Arbitration Conventions: The Quandary of
Non-Ratification," 17 Harvard International Law Journal  131-137.
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TABLE 2
Matrix Of Inter-Country Legal Agreements Covering Commercial Areas
Argentina Brazil Bolivia Chile Colombia Ecuador Peru Uruguay
Venezuela
Argentina 0 12 1 3 1 1 1 1
0
Brazil 12 0 1 4 3 2 0 2
0
Bolivia 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
Chile 3 4 0 0 2 1 3 1
1
Colombia 1 3 0 2 0 0 0 0
0
Ecuador 1 2 0 1 0 0 2 0
0
Peru 1 0 0 3 0 2 0 0
1
Uruguay 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0
1
Venezuela 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
0
TOTAL 20 24 2 15 6 6 7 5
3
 Table 2 above breaks down the pattern of international agreements for each
country and shows a clear picture where the region's most dynamic economies are also the
ones that are more likely to reach international legal commercial agreements involving
harmonization of rules and standards.29
 One can also argue that as an increasing number of business exchanges occur in
countries with overlapping growing trade-related sectors, their need for legal harmonization
will tend to increase.  This could explain why in Table 2 we observe that most attempts to
harmonize legal frameworks have mainly involved countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile.  These countries all experienced growth in their most dynamic and capital-intensive
                                                
29Note that an  international legal agreement addressing the harmonization of standards is a
much weaker form of harmonization than the international agreements involving the
international convergence in commercial rules.
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trade-related sectors (i.e., agro-manufacturing, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, steel,
financial services, transportation, communications, and energy).30
Asymmetries in market size are usually blamed for failures to reach economic and
legal integration.  If one aims at understanding the social forces behind these and other drives
for legal convergence, the most promising approach is provided, not just by addressing the
differences in market size.  In contrast, international legal convergence must also be
understood within the frameworks proposed by North (1982) and Olson (1984) and here
applied to the international case studied here.  In our case, foreign pressures coupled with
the political weight and rent–seeking of the lobby groups associated with the main
productive domestic sectors affected by integration (in our case, trade-related sectors)
influences the political actors’ perceptions of the costs and benefits of legal convergence.
For example, Buscaglia (1994) shows that during the 19th century the domestic political
processes throughout the region assigned greater political weight to landowners and
merchants linked to the export sectors during a time when the Gold Standard ruled the
world of international trade and financial flows.31  In this context, legal change and
integration had little to do with social welfare maximization and much more to do with
international political influence and domestic redistributive arguments, what Schwartz and
Sykes (1996) denominate "political welfare-maximization."32   It can be then said that
redistributive forces may slow down or speed up the process of institutional reform, but
there is no doubt that political welfare-maximization related factors have had a powerful
influence in shaping legal institutions throughout Latin American history.  For example, one
can observe that in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, ad hoc advising congressional committees
composed exclusively of landowners and merchants connected to the exports sector, joined
by foreign pressure business  groups, were asked to provide assessments of the civil,
commercial, and criminal codes during the amendment procedures.33  The advice provided
by these committees was often quoted and followed during the debates in the Senate and
                                                
30Vazquez Presedo, Vicente (1981), Historia Economica del Cono Sur, Editorial EUDEBA,
pp. 12-45.
31Buscaglia, Edgardo (1994), "Legal and Economic Development in Latin America: The
Missing Links," Journal of Inter American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp.
45-59.
32The links between the political arm of lobbies and the business institutions associated with
them often yields rents and higher profits for the firms involved.  See Olson, Mancur (1982),
The Rise  and Decline of Nations, New Haven: Yale, pp.34-73.  Also refer to Warren
Schwartz and Sykes, Alan (1996), "Toward a Positive Theory of The Most Favored Nation
Obligation and its Exceptions in the WTO/GATT System," International Review of Law and
Economics, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 27-51.
33See Perez Roldan (1963), La Adopcion y Debates de los Codigos en los Senados del
Continente.  Editorial Perfil, Buenos Aires.
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Chambers of Deputies.34  Moreover, the opinions issued by these committees were the
foundation of key changes to the newly enacted codes.  No other domestic groups were
included in this political process.  All this occurred during the period when the Gold
Standard determined the terms of trade and trade patterns worldwide and during which all
countries in Latin America were dependent upon foreign capital for their development.35
One  should also pay attention to other catalysts of legal change.  For example,
starting in the mid 20
th century, developed economies generating technologies, led by the
United States, started to rely heavily on the application of unilateral pressure and sanctions in
order to stop the infringement of their multinationals’ property rights.  Suspension of
preferential tariffs and trade sanctions were the most common policy tools for punishing
developing countries.36  As shown in a jurimetric study by Buscaglia and Guerrero (1995),
these foreign pressures can explain the legal convergence observed in intellectual property
laws.  Foreign pressures notwithstanding, this study also shows that the trade-related legal
convergence observed throughout Latin America is mainly  explained by favorable incentives
within the political and economic systems of the region.
Based on the historical experience explained above, one can also show that the
most recent legal reforms introduced within the legal systems of Latin America’s largest
exporters during the 1990’s  are also following this same historical pattern of
harmonizations.  Following the same historical pattern described above, legal reforms in
Latin American countries are still the product of the joint effect of local political conditions
and foreign economic pressures.37  For example, notwithstanding constitutional reforms in
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, Buscaglia and Guerrero (1995) have shown that
foreign economic pressures to reform commercial laws during the period 1950-90 arose
particularly because an increasing proportion of imports to these countries consisted of
information-intensive and capital-intensive goods and services.38 For example, this study
                                                
34Id. at 121-134.
35For a description of how the Gold Standard affected international business transactions, see
McKinnon, Ronald (1982), "The Order of Economic Liberalization: Lessons from Chile and
Argentina." In Economic Policy in a World of Change, edited by K. Brunner and A.
Metzler, pp. 159-86, Amsterdam: North Holland.
36An example of unilateral measures aimed at inducing legal changes in Latin America is
provided by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19. 1301-1303 (amending
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to include a “Special 301” to deal with intellectual
property protection.).  Section 301 authorizes the U.S. Government to reduce Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) benefits (i.e., preferential tariffs) or their elimination, and the
imposition of import restrictions -- or even retaliatory measures
37Buscaglia, Edgardo Jr. (1994), "Legal and Economic Development: The Missing Links,"
Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 153-169.
38See Buscaglia , Edgardo and Jose Luis Guerrero (1995), "A Quantitative Analysis of
Counterfeiting Activities in Developing Countries During the Pre-GATT Period," Jurimetric
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shows that in countries with a poor enforcement record and lack of international
harmonization drive, intellectual property was subject to a constant pattern of infringements
due to the lack of a domestic producer base with a stake in this modern sector.39  As a
result, advanced-country firms generating these technologies were then demanding their
governments’ use of trade sanctions or threats of loss of trade benefits as a way to punish
less-developed countries’ unauthorized use of intellectual property.40
From a domestic policy perspective, Buscaglia (1994) also shows that a movement
toward legal integration also covered the period within which an import substitution
approach to development was implemented.  As a product of the Great Depression, from
the early 1930s until the 1980s, Latin America and almost all other developing countries
encouraged domestic (import substitution) manufacturing investment, suppressed agricultural
prices, and expanded the size of their public sector enterprises while attempting to stimulate
savings and investment through taxation and credit allocated by the public sector.  The
prevailing view was that a shortage of domestic physical capital was the key impediment to
development
In this context, Latin America's attempts at legal integration during the period 1930-
1980 were also conceived as an integral part of this import-substituting industrialization
(ISI), a strategy strongly advocated and supported by the Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLA), a branch of the United Nations (known more widely in Latin America by
its Spanish nomenclature:  Comision Economica para America Latina or CEPAL).  For
ECLA/CEPAL, regional integration offered a way to provide markets large enough to
satisfy economies of scale and scope which would, in turn, strengthen the import-substitution
process.  Non-reciprocity and preferential treatment were to be granted through
international legal agreements in accordance with, or dependent upon, the level of economic
development of individual countries.  Tariff barriers against countries outside the region
                                                                                                                                           
Journal, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 23-37; and International Trade Reporter, Washington:  Bureau
of National Affairs (3/91) pp. 234-256.
39Id. at 34.
40  The international harmonization of intellectual property rules and standards can also be
understood from a historical perspective.  The Paris and Berne Conventions, administered by
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), governed the international protection of
intellectual property during more than a centuryThe Paris Convention, Berne Convention, and
others that are assigned to protect intellectual property, are administered by the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), founded in 1967 as a specialized agency of the
United Nations.  The three most important international agreements under WIPO are: (1) the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (103 nation members) established in
1883, (2) the Madrid Agreement concerning the International Registration of Marks (twenty
nine states) adopted in 1891; (3) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (ninety members) adopted in 1886.  WIPO administers a total of nineteen
unions and conventions.  One of these treaties is the Patent Cooperation Treaty of 1970
(PCT) (51 members).  PCT provides for the filing of international patent applications, thereby
facilitating the examination of patent applications in the patent office of other member
countries.
14 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2001,  Paper 1
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2001/iss1/art115
would serve to protect Latin American products and enable them to compete more
effectively against foreign imports.  In brief, the ECLA recipe for regional integration was an
inward-looking strategy, conceived and understood as a "collective defense" for sheltering
Latin America from adverse fluctuations in the world economy.41
Import substitution industries grew behind protective walls based on subsidies and
tariffs in a milieu where many other determinants of the rate of economic growth, such as
investment in human capital and the role of microeconomic incentives, were completely
ignored by policymakers.  Protection of import substitution industries allowed domestic
prices and costs to far exceed international prices and created little incentive for efficiency.
These protected industries produced substitutes for imports but usually depended on the
import of raw materials and technology.  Domestic demands for foreign exchange and the
region’s international debt grew rapidly over time as these firms and their governments
imported capital goods to accelerate investment.42  In this context, the import substitution
approach to development came to an end during the international debt crisis of the 1980s
when developing countries’ policymakers realized that internal markets and protection of
infant industries were not enough to assure sustainable growth.43
The failure of the ISI strategy combined with the second oil shock, debt crises, and
recession in the developed world (which reduced the demand for developing-country
exports) led to the 1980’s Latin American economic crisis.  As a result, international legal
harmonizations acquired a new form.  By the early 1980s most countries in the region
started to adopt pro-business market-driven economic policies to address the problems
posed by large foreign debts, high inflation, and huge fiscal deficits.  The ultimate goal of this
free-market economic prescription was to push through legislative bodies laws needed to
deregulate and liberalize trade so that the market, rather than the state, would be the ultimate
referee on how resources would be allocated.44
                                                
41 Rosenthal, G. (1991), "Un Informe Critico a 30 anos de Integracion en America Latina,"
Nueva Sociedad 113 (Mayo-Junio) 60-65;  also refer to Buscaglia, Edgardo and Thomas
Ulen, Paper Presented at the 1996 Annual Meetings of the American Law and Economics
Association at Stanford University.
42   See Buscaglia, Edgardo and Thomas Ulen, Paper Presented at the 1996 Annual Meetings
of the American Law and Economics Association at Stanford University.
43For a complete description of this process, see Buscaglia, Edgardo Jr. (1993), "Law,
Technological Progress, and Economic Development," Hoover Institution Policy Studies,
Stanford University.
44 As part of this new strategy and in order to address the crises, some countries ammended
their constitutions (e.g. Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico), while others pursued this new
approach to policy-making on a legal piece meal basis (e.g. Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela).
For more details on the nature of the region’s domestic legal reforms see Barragan, Julio
(1994), Como se Hacen las Leyes.  Buenos Aires: Editorial Planeta.  For details on the
macroeconomic aspects of reforms refer to Sebastian Edwards (1991), Latin American
Economic Reform, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, pp.  23-35.
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III. A JURIMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC FACTORS
AFFECTING  LEGAL HARMINIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RULES
The regional drive towards legal harmonization in Latin America has never been uniform.
More specifically, one can observe that countries with overlapping dynamic trade-related
sectors (i.e. experiencing  a higher proportion of intra-sectoral international trade as a
proportion of total trade) also have  private sectors demanding compatible legal frameworks
in their foreign markets within the areas affecting their products or foreign direct investment
within their sector of the economy.  We have already described how this has been true
under both, the import substitution industrialization and the export-driven periods.   In this
context, imagine two types of countries hoping to harmonize their commercial laws: countries
where private commercial laws are not far from their evolutionary agrarian base and with
weak non-agricultural sectors producing information-intensive products exist (e.g., Bolivia,
Paraguay), and, in contrast, countries with relatively evolved commercial legal systems (i.e.
legal systems addressing a much wider range and higher complexity of economic
interactions) and with a high proportion of their trade concentrated on dynamic sectors (such
as Argentina, Brazil , and Chile).  The quantitative evidence (Table 1 and 2) and the analysis
advanced above would predict that legal harmonization involving agrarian countries,
possessing legal systems that are not far from its evolutionary base, will have less motives to
seek legal integration.  For example, one can currently observe that private sector firms in
Bolivia or Uruguay importing Brazilian computer software and hardware, compact disks, or
movies, actually oppose the enactment of foreign investment protection or intellectual
property laws compatible with the needs and interests of the Brazilian firms exporting these
products to Bolivia.45
                                                
45Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Argentina), Comunicado No 342-92; and supra note
45 at 67.
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Let’s now test the above hypotheses.  We measure the following independent variables
that are aimed at explaining a country’s drive to harmonize it’s laws:
•  The number of economic-related amendments to a country’s civil/commercial codes
(# of Ammendments);
•  The annual number of non-agricultural trade-related industries experiencing an
average annual real growth of  2 percent or more in their compounded annual sales.
This variable is designed to capture the  economic dynamics and changes in
economic structure (# of Non-agricultural trade-related industries);
•  The average intra-sectoral international trade as a proportion of total trade
(Average intra-trade as a % of total trade).
•  The relative size of the national GDP as compared to the region’s GDP (National
GDP as a % Of the Region’s GDP)
•  The annual growth in trade between pairs of countries (Growth Internat Trade)
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TABLE 3: MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 46
VARIABLE TO BE EXPLAINED: Number of International Legal Agreements47       
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS: 90
MULTIPLE R: 0.619
SQUARED MULTIPLE R: 0.514
STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE:  1.92
VARIABLE      COEFFICIENT     ERROR     TOLERANCE             T              P
Constant               1.46           0.12                              12.16    
0.00
# of Ammendments     0.10          0.01             0.95             7.49     
0.02
# of Non-Agricultural
trade-related Industries  1.08          0.05              0.95                   21.60    
0.00
Average intra-trade as
 a % of total trade   2.02         0.23             0.99                       8.78     
0.00
National GDP as a %
                                                
46  An exponential link among the variables was tested and rejected for lack of fitness.  The
Sims’ test was also applied in order to show the direction of causality.  The data related to  the
number of international legal agreements per country (as our dependent variable)  is contained
in Carcano, Miguel Angel (1941), Historia Diplomatica Argentina en sus Relaciones
Comerciales con la Region Latinoamericana, Buenos Aires: Ed. Perfil, pp. 56-62; from
Urrutia, Juan Jose (1994) “Los Acuerdos Comerciales Internacionales en el Continente
Americano: Precedentes para la Region.” Informe Tecnico, GATT Doc. 2340-BTM 391:
In dealing with the independent or explanatory variables the data was drawn from the
following sources: (i) the annual number of amendments to the domestic civil codes dealing
with commercial aspects is provided by Aragon, Ramiro (1978), Estudio Cuantitativo de la
Codificacion Civil y Comercial en Latinoamerica.  Buenos Aires: Editorial EUDEBA; (ii)
the quantitative data related to the annual growth in sales of the non-agricultural manufacturing
and service industries (i.e. # of Non-Agricultural  trade-related Industries)  is taken from
Vazquez, Julio (1991), La Historia Economica de America del Sur.  Rosario, Argentina:
Editorial Atlantida, pp. 12-17.
(iii) Macroeconomic data related to national, regional GDP (i.e. National GDP as a % Of the
Region’s GDP), growth in international trade (i.e. Growth in Int. Trade) and intrasectoral trade
(i.e. Average intra-trade as  a % of total trade  is taken from Montenegro, Raul Jose (1980),
Historia Economica del Nuevo Mundo: Editorial EUDEBA, pp. 56-119.
47 The international legal agreements include data on the harmonization of legal standards (e.g.
health standards applied to merchandise crossing international borders), the harmonization of
legal standards applied to commerce in general (e.g. codifying the principles of territoriality
and independence), the harmonization of rules (e.g. duration and scope of patents), and the
harmonization of legal doctrines (e.g. the doctrine of equivalence in the treatment of real
property or the fair use doctrine in the use of copyrights).
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Of the Region’s GDP  0.05  0.15     0.86                  0.33
0.34
Growth Internat. Trade   0.07    0.33     0.93                       0.21
0.45
By applying multiple least squares regression analysis, in Table 3 we can see that the
first three explanatory variables are significant at the 5 percent level and all have the
expected signs. That is, a country’s larger number of international legal agreements aimed at
harmonizing its commercial laws with the rest of the world will be explained by  first, the
higher number of amendments to its domestic civil code indicating the presence of a higher
domestic legal complexity addressing new types of economic interactions; second, by a
higher percentage growth in its international intra-sectoral trade with the region (i.e. showing
the presence of domestic economic actors with a stake in harmonizing international rules in
order to expand their markets abroad on a “one law-one market” basis), and, third, by a
higher annual percentage growth in sales within the non-agricultural trade-related sectors
(i.e. showing the presence of demand driven trade-related sectors aiming at expanding its
markets).
Please note that the annual number of international legal accords used to measure
our dependant discrete variable include all agreements involving the trade-related non
agricultural industries defined above.  On the other hand, the relative size of a country within
the region (National GDP as a % of the Region’s GDP) and the annual percentage growth in
international trade between two countries (Growth in Trade) show no significance in the
explanation of legal harmonizing agreements.  In other words, relative size and movements in
annual international trade, in general, do not explain a country’s drive to harmonize
international legal standards and legal rules.  Finally, we see that 51.4 percent of the
variability in our dependent variable is explained by the independent variables included here.
Therefore, the jurimetrics results here are consistent with the fact that a large
proportion of international trade based on intra-sectoral exchanges between two countries
creates an incentive for the private sectors in these countries to demand harmony in the rules
of their international trade (i.e. a drive towards a “one market-one law” business
conditions).48  This simply means that a bottom-up legal framework would emerge if enough
overlapping in economic structures exist.  Table 4 below addresses this point by  showing
the proportion of total intra-sectoral bilateral trade for a sample of agrarian and “dynamic”
economies.  As stated above, one would expect that the larger the proportion of intra-
sectoral trade, the more pronounced the propensity to seek legal harmonization.
                                                
48  See Buscaglia, Edgardo and Clarisa Long (1997) at 21
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TABLE 449
Growth in Intra-Sector. Bilateral Trade as a %  of Total Bilateral Trade: 1960-98
Argentina Brazil Chile  Uruguay Paraguay
Argentina 9.5 2.1 0.3 0.2
Brazil 3.9 0.8 0.6
Chile 1.0 0.1
Uruguay 0.0
Based on the evidence shown in Table 4, we expect that a larger proportion of
export-driven dynamic economic sectors engaging in intra-sectoral trade, such as
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, would be actively supporting economic integration and the
harmonization of commercial rules applied within their industries sectors.  The Graph below
shows the historical pattern relating high levels of intra-sectoral trade with a strong drive to
seek legal integration. The number of trade-related international agreements is measured on
the vertical axis while a country’s  proportion of total international trade classified as intra-
sectoral trade is measured on the horizontal axis.  One can observe a pattern already
established in the correlation and regression analyses presented above.  If one considers the
period 1890-1990, the agrarian economies of South America have shown a poor record in
seeking international legal harmonization while those economies with private sectors engaged
in cross-border trade and investments tend to seek a “one-market-one-law” approach to
international exchanges.50
                                                
49 Data related to the Average intra-trade as  a % of total trade  is taken from Montenegro,
Raul Jose (1980), Historia Economica del Nuevo Mundo: Editorial EUDEBA, pp. 56-119
50 The graph shows Venezuela as an outlier within the group.  The linearized fit was
tested and met.  Moreover, the standard assumptions required by the regression analysis
presented above have been met.
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# LEGAL TREATIES vs. AVERAGE INTRA SECTORAL TRADE: 1890-
Average Intra-Sectoral Trade as a % of Total
Historical evidence shows that industries such as agro-manufacturing, computer-
related material, food manufacturing, energy, and textiles actively support policies to
harmonize international commercial laws by actively lobbying before the Argentine and
Brazilian Congress.51  These industries have also pushed for the establishment of more
effective and uniform procedures for dispute resolution mechanisms.52   For example,
MERCOSUR's provision for binational corporations has led to the establishment of 11
Argentine-Brazilian joint ventures, particularly in communications, computer, and
pharmaceutical industries  that are designed to expand market operations.53  In addition, at
                                                
51Id. at 56.
52This is a clear trend in public opinion observed in Gallup polls throughout the region.  For
more details, see Edgardo Buscaglia and Maria Dakolias, (1995), "Judicial Crises: Court Delay
and Backlogs in Latin America" Working Paper # 87, Georgetown University School of
Business.
52The results indicate that in samples of 60 to 100 firms per country, the majority of these
enterprises consider the role of the judiciary to be "deficient."  These businesses consider the
lack of a reliable judiciary  within MERCOSUR countries as one of the main reasons for
seeking a predictable dispute resolution mechanism.  Id. at pp. 25-31.
53Id. at 34.
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least a hundred agreements for cross-border cooperation have been signed between
Argentine and Brazilian companies in industries as diverse as automotive, banking, steel,
aluminum, and plastic.54  MERCOSUR has also provided the legal framework for sector-
by-sector agreements among private entrepreneurial associations that has contributed to the
harmonization of rules aforementioned.  For example, Argentine and Brazilian associations
of steel producers have signed 34 and 30 accords regulating the treatment of patents,
copyrights and trademarks.55  In contrast, for the reasons shown above, the same degree of
harmonization efforts is not observed among Uruguayan and Paraguayan firms and no legal
integration initiatives have been advanced or accepted from the governments of Uruguay and
Paraguay.56
                                                
54Argentine Secretariat of Economic Planning, Document 341-TA, pp. 12-13
55Id. at 34.
56Informe del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report) No
1345/HA34, May 29, 1994.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Social scientists have usually viewed regional institutional integration as a series of
multiple interactions among national governments that would lead to the creation of new
supranational decision-making institutions -- to which the national governments would
gradually cede their authority over domestic issues.  In this mainstream view, the citizens of
those states would eventually and passively come to redefine their loyalties and extend their
identification to encompass the new entity.57  In this context, during the 1960s and '70s,
functional theorists viewed integration as a linear development and as a  state-driven process
in which such regional groupings would pass through successive stages of ever increasing
institutionalization.  It was assumed that initial state-by-state initiatives would lead to
"spillover" effects in which, as the scope of integration deepened and broadened, closer
cooperation in one area would engender -- in a positive way -- the movement toward
integration in other related areas as well.
However, this mainstream account does not fit the historical evolution of legal and
economic integration in developing countries in general and within Latin America specifically.
Spillover effects failed to materialize.58  After some promising beginnings, most regional
integration efforts (in Africa, Asia, and Latin America) tended to lose steam and, after a
period of time, collapse.  It has been argued that this linear theory of how integration
develops is not really applicable to Latin America because the "balance between the push of
formal institution building and the pull of informal interactions tends to be unstable and
fragile."59   Nonetheless, conventional theory posits that regional integration must be
accompanied by a process of formal and state-driven institution-building if it hopes to
survive.60
In contrast, our framework proposed here views legal harmonization of commercial
rules of international trade as a result of a bottom-up process driven by related economic
industries on different sides of international borders engaging in increasing  intra-sectoral
trade.  This contrasts with the aforementioned top-down conventional approach used to
understand past drives to legal and economic integration.  In our framework, we showed
that once a trade agreement has been organized, its future development and growth is much
determined and driven by the private sector’s  perceptions -- whether real or apparent -- of
                                                
57Dougherty, J. and L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (1990), Contending Theories in International
Relations (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Harper & Row, p. 433.
58 Refer to Buscaglia and Long (1997)
59 See van Klevener, supra note 65 at 24.
60Mols, M. (1993), "The Integration Agenda: A Framework for Comparison" in Peter H.
Smith (ed.) The Challenge of Integration: Europe and the Americas, Coral Gables,
FL:University of Miami  North-South Center, pp.12-17.
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the issues and burdens they must face.  In this context, history shows that the states that
comprise a successful regional bloc must constantly deal and address the pros and cons of
integration-related issues brought before them by a variety of private actors, domestic and
international.  How are integration-related benefits distributed among, and across, the
member countries?  In other words, who gains (and who loses) from integration?  Do the
payoffs justify the effort?  Do some partners reap benefits at the expense of others?  In the
final analysis, these are crucial considerations that also determine the ultimate success or
failure of regional cooperation/integration over the long run.  Yet, scholars of the so-called
"realist" school of international relations, which holds that states operate at the international
level in a state of anarchy, must come to terms with the invisible hand behind the success or
failure of their efforts.  As shown above through the examination of our jurimetric evidence,
international differences in the composition and nature of the economic structures of the
countries involved will represent the real obstacle or promoter of legal/economic integration.
Given this context, foreign pressures on developing countries coupled with the compatibility
of economic structures trading across borders have all combined to create the incentives
needed for the international harmonization of legal rules and standards.
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